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Story has traditionally been seen as something separate to gameplay—frequently relegated to an afterthought or epiphenomenon.
Nevertheless, in the FPS genre there has been something of a renaissance in the notion of the story-driven title. Partially, this is due
to advances in technology enabling a greater capacity for distributed storytelling and a better integration of story and gameplay.
However, what has been underrecognised is the dynamic, epistemological, and psychological impact of story and story elements
upon player behaviour. It is argued here that there is evidence that story may have a direct influence upon cognitive operations.
Specifically, evidence is presented that it appears to demonstrate that games with highly visible, detailed stories may assist players
in recalling and ordering their experiences. If story does, indeed, have a more direct influence, then it is clearly a more powerful
and immediate tool in game design than either simply reward system or golden thread.
Copyright © 2008 Dan Pinchbeck. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License,
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
1. INTRODUCTION
In our recent paper [1], we discussed a simple study
designed to oﬀer evidence of one of the ways in which
nonludically significant devices within an FPS game have
a direct impact upon how the experience of the game is
recalled and reported. Subjects played one of two games with
very diﬀerent levels of visibility and importance of story and
then undertook a semistructured interview based around
four major aspects: plot, character, avatar, and world. The
research focus was whether subjects appeared to utilise story
as a framework for their recall.
Narrative and games have a rather turbulent historical
relationship, particularly in academic circles, but it is not
our intention to add to volume of writing on this subject
here. Thus, rather than entering into a debate about the
relative narrativity of games, we will concern ourselves with
the functional operation of story in FPS systems and, in
particular, how they might relate to memory.
Firstly, we will oﬀer an alternate way of conceptualising
story information in games that coopts both Barthes’
atomisation of narrative [2] and Carr’s appropriation of
the protonarrative [3]. Secondly, we will briefly introduce
the notion of narrative psychology and the claims that
there exist innate story-like structures in cognition that
would predispose subjects towards the favoring of story-like
sequences, the interpretation of sequences as stories, or better
recall of sequences with highly apparent story-like structures.
2. STORY IN GAMES AS PROTONARRATIVE NETWORK
Barthes argues for four fundamental units that act as the
building blocks of all narrative [2, pages 79–124]. These units
are divided into functions, which relay action, and indices
which relate to abstract, atmospheric, or psychological
notions. For example, the unit “He wrote” would be classed
as a function as it conveys an irreducible action, whereas “He
was tense” falls into the category of indices. Both categories
may be further defined: functions according to their relative
importance and impact, and indices according to their level
of abstraction or specifity.
Barthes classes functions as either cardinal, which are
both consecutive and consequential, or catalyst, which are
only consecutive. In other words, cardinal functions are
critical to narrative progression, whereas catalysts may be
crucial to the telling of the story but their omission will not
aﬀect the basic structure of the story itself. True indices refer
to “the character of a narrative agent” [2, page 96] such as an
emotion, mood, or atmosphere, whilst the other subclasses,
informants, locate within the temporal environment of the
narrative. Barthes argues that everything within a narrative
is essentially constructed from these four classes of objects.
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In itself, this taxonomy is important because it enables a
structural, rather than semantic, classification to occur when
approaching narratives, asking questions such as whether
there is a dearth of catalyst functions (suggesting a lean,
reportage style of text), or large numbers of informants
presen (perhaps prompting a higher level of trust in the
reliability of the narrative).
The idea of functional units is extremely powerful
because they operate far below the threshold of a fully formed
narrative situation that has been so problematically applied
to games. Conceptually, it is not diﬃcult to conceive of
a situation whereby as Jenkins notes “Narrative can also
enter games on the level of localized incident, or what I
am calling micronarratives” [4, page 125]. However, his
conceptualization of micronarrative is problematic as it just
seems to lower the threshold beyond which a sequence can
be defined as a narrative, which rather misses the point of
the ludologists issues with their structure rather than their
scale [5, 6]. More useful is Carr’s notion of protonarratives.
Carr also notes that narratives are composed of isolatable
units that, whilst not containing explicit causal sequences,
have a form of interpretative predisposition hardwired into
them [3]. In other words, we can understand a network of
units that, when perceived, is likely to lend themselves to
one particular interpretation over another. Bartlett famously
conducted a study, whereby native American myths with
nonwestern narrative structures were converted in memory
by Western subjects to yield more conformist and recog-
nisable Western narratives [7, pages 64–94]. Between the
preexisting interpretative structures of the subject and a
network of protonarrative units that predisposes a particular
interpretative outcome, a story is formed. Thus, for the
remainder of this paper, when we speak of stories, it is the
protonarrative network with its predetermined relationships
we are referring to.
This conceptualization of story neatly sidesteps the
narrativity debate by not requiring games themselves to be
narrative objects, but simply to contain a set of objects at
least some of which have predetermined semantic as well
as ludic relationships. Protonarrative networks may contain
sequences, but it is just as likely that the colocation of their
constituent elements will be enough to trigger a particular
interpretation by the player. There are very clear links here to
schema theory.
3. SCHEMA, STORY, AND GAMES
Schema theory essentially posits a set of inbuilt and learned
mental architectures that hold generalised situational knowl-
edge. Schank and Abelson’s contextual dependency theory
[8] is schematic at root such as Minsky’s frames: “a data-
structure for representing a stereotyped situation” [9, page
1]. The basic notion of schema is that once enough cues have
been received to trigger the schematic response; the following
operations are essentially put through this filter.
Thus, not only may we infer a story schema from
Bartlett ’s study, but we can also propose schema for media
experience and gaming. Indeed, Ijsselsteijn (2003) argues
that learned schemata are fundamental factors in users’
experiences of media:
From the anecdotal evidence accumulating throughout
media history, it becomes clear that people’s responses to
media are not a linear product of the extent of sensory
information that the medium provides but are very much
shaped by people’s previous experience with and expecta-
tions towards media. It would seem a little odd to us now
if people should panic and run out of a movie theatre at the
sight of an approaching train on the screen. This is because
our media schemata, or knowledge representations of what
media are, and are capable of, tell us what to expect from
mediated experiences, including the perceptual tricks that
cinema or VR can play on us. (2003:37).
When schemata are triggered, they adjust the interpreta-
tion of further signals, making other schemata more or less
likely to fire in turn: priming occurs. For example, closure
is generally agreed to be a fundamental, even unavoidable
aspect of narrative, to the extent that Kermode wonders,
“Why does it require a more strenuous eﬀort to believe that
a narrative lacks coherence than to believe that somehow,
if one could only find it, it doesn’t?” [10, page 53]. Thus,
when the schema for story fires, we could postulate that
it increases the expectations of closure and following the
type of interpretive activity that may occur. Equally, once
a situation crosses the threshold to be identified as a first-
person shooter, the shooter schema fires and predisposes
a certain type of perceptual activity and action. In a pilot
study, Pinchbeck et al. [11] noted that experienced FPS
players tended to centralize their gaze and use the mouse
to visually explore the environment, whereas inexperienced
players tended to keep the mouse static and allow their gaze
to move around the screen. A possible explanation of this
disparity in visual behaviour is that experienced players know
that shots, when they need to be fired, will hit whatever is
central on the screen. Thus, it is advantageous to synchronise
the acts of visual exploration and aiming.
Schemata oﬀer a model by which a network of units
would trigger a particular interpretative frame. In other
words, all a game needs to do is to contain a suitable network
of protonarrative objects, and a player will tend towards a
story-like interpretation of their play. This oﬀers a functional
bridge between Juul’s “real rules and fictional worlds” [12,
page 163]. A story interpretation, therefore, becomes, as Rein
and Schon describe “one of a class of framing procedures,
that is, strategies for organising and deriving solutions for
problems” [13], or “an organising principle for human
action.” [14]. In other words, a protonarrative network which
triggers a story schema to fire as the primary interpretative
device may help players to understand what occurs during
the game session It should also be noted that there is no
contradiction or complication arising from both story and
shooter schema firing simultaneously. The experience of
playing, Bioshock (2007) or S.T.A.L.K.E.R. (2007) games
which invests so much, so clearly, in their stories, is clear
evidence of this.
This paper is primarily concerned with the simple
question of whether a strong story helps players remember
more of their gameplay experience and in better detail. This
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begs the question of why we might expect this to be the case,
and that requires us to consider the relationship between
memory and story in a little more detail.
4. STORIES AND MEMORY
In his classic study, Tulving proposed a distinction between
two forms of memory:
“Episodic memory receives and stores information
about temporally dated episodes or events, and
temporal-spatial relations among these events. A per-
ceptual event—is always stored in terms of its autobi-
ographical reference to the already existing contents
of the episodic memory store. Semantic memory is
the memory necessary for the use of language. It is
a mental thesaurus, organized knowledge a person
possesses about words and other verbal symbols,
their meaning and referents, about relations among
them, and about rules, formulas, and algorithms for
the manipulation of these symbols, concepts, and
relations.” [15, pages 385–387].
Eysenck and Keane [16, page 165] note that there has
been some controversies whether this distinction actually
obfuscates a unitary process, but it is the natural fusion
of episodic memory and schema that are of interest here.
In particular, the autobiographical and temporal aspects of
episodic memory have very clear conceptual relationships to
the notion of story schema and, indeed, narrative psychology
has made much of this.
Conceptually, there is only a short step to be made from
an autobiographical memory, where a sense of coherent self
relative to a sequence of events is held by an organism, to the
idea that our inner experience is a form of story in itself—
though at this point we will revert to the term narrative
in keeping with the literature and to avoid confusion
with our ludically orientated definition of story used else-
where. Robinson and Hawpe make this point, for example,
“Experience does not automatically assume narrative form.
Rather, it is in reflecting on experience that we construct
stories” [13, page 111]. This would seem to suggest that
whilst episodic memory in itself needs not be explicitly
narrative, any reflection upon it is. Further, Crossley argues
that by planning our lives and ourselves, we engage in a
filtering process, thus, creating an ongoing narrative from
the nonlinear, frequently noncausal complexity of life [17].
Equally, our own actions and responses, includingmemories,
are filtered and represented to form the self.
Indeed, the self may be seen as the result, illusory or
not, of predictable responses to environmental situations.
In other words, a sense of coherence in response suggests a
coherent, locatable self at the centre of a complex and shifting
world. Thus, the inward projection of a self as distinct from
the environment, tied up in the process of distal attribution,
or reality inferral [18], requires a temporal sequence of
coherence in order to logically maintain itself. In other
words, without a sense that the self that is being postulated
existed prior to the current experience, and without the sense
that past and current experiences fall along a single trajectory
of ongoing experience, the construct cannot be maintained.
The autobiographical function of episodic memory may,
then, not simply be to enable the storage, recovery, and
implementation of representations of prior events and body
states, but also to enable the illusion of a singular, unitary self
to exist in the first place. Just as the psychological processes
surrounding presence, vection, and so forth, all enable the
organism to separate itself from the environmental field,
so episodic memory anchors it to its own developmental
past. If the formation of causal sequences in relation to a
stable perspective is fundamental to the sense of self, then,
narrative is given a very core position in our subjective being
indeed. Bruner, for example, argues for a “protolinguistic
readiness for narrative organisation and discourse” [19, page
80], whilst Nath [20] contends that narrative is a critical
component of assembling a subjective stance and thus crucial
to any experience. Underlying these claims is, however, a
rather weak and inclusive definition of narrative, more an
“assimilating structure” [21, page 91] than a represented
causal sequence. We are reminded of Juul’s point that in the
narrative/ludology debate, the narrativists were characterised
by a very inclusive definition of narratives, whereas the
ludologists demanded a much less inclusive one [12, pages
156–159].
Once again, schema theory oﬀers a middle ground. We
do appear to be, at least given the evidence of their ubiquity,
story-telling animals as Schank has argued [22]. Stories are
common and powerful schema, and what can be taken from
themore extreme narrative psychology positions is that there
is a conceptual and structural closeness between schema and
narratives that may explain why this is the case. In terms of
games, the tendency for us to tell stories may lead us to two
hypotheses:
(i) That player will tend to format their gameplay
experiences as stories, even when story is not a
dominant feature of gameplay. This is analogous to
Bartlett’s subjects framing the contents of “The War
of the Ghosts” to fit their most comfortable means of
recall;
(ii) That where the protonarrative units within a game
(world, characters, and avatar) can most easily be
formed into a network, or where a stronger set of
predetermined relationships (the plot) exists, players
will find it easier to remember details about these
units which are not directly related to gameplay. In
other words, by formatting the play experience as
a story, nonludically significant detail will be more
easily and eﬀectively recalled.
5. THE STUDY
This is all very well in principle and theory, but what
empirical evidence can be oﬀered to support it, and how
does it relate to the practical business of game development?
The following section is a summary of the paper original
published at Cyber games 2007, and the reader is referred to
this paper for a full analysis of results [1].
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A simple study was carried out, whereby twenty-six
participants played either Bethsheda’s Call of Cthulhu: Dark
Corners of the Earth (2006), or id’s Doom3: Resurrection
of Evil (2005) for 40 minutes in more-or-less natural
playing conditions and then undertook a semistructured
interview. In this interview, subjects were asked to discuss
four factors in their experiences: the world they explored,
the characters they met, the avatar they controlled, and
the sequence of events—literally “what happened when
you played the game?” There were two data sets under
investigation. Firstly, the quantity and quality of information
about the gameplay experience reported; and secondly,
whether there was apparent use of clear story structuring in
the reports obtained. Thus, the study aimed to determine
whether there was any evidence that a game with a strong
and complex story such as Cthulhu (CTH) aided recall or
prompted recall with a story-like structure, and whether
either of these factors were present or diminished in the
relatively unnarrative resurrection of evil (RES). Readers are
referred to the original paper for a discussion of the in-game
narratives and gameplay of these titles. The key factors of the
results are, however, reproduced below.
5.1. Character
CTH subjects demonstrated a generally good grasp of the
large cast in the opening levels of the game. When asked
“Can you tell me about some of the characters you met
in the game?”, most subjects responded by talking about
classes of characters. Individuals were mentioned less and,
interestingly, the most frequently mentioned individuals
were not actually met in the game but integrated within goal
structure. However, it was intriguing to note that 5 subjects
included the avatar in their choices of reported characters.
By contrast, there are only two named NPCs in RES, one
(George) is met briefly during the first level and the other
(McNeil) being visually introduced in the opening cutscene
and represented by occasional radio contact. Alongside, there
is an unnamed marine who bequeaths his weapon and
immediately dies and various unnamed and doomed voices
that occasionally come through over the radio. The opening
cutscene shows the player’s squad being killed prior to play
starting. What is interesting is that given the paucity of
NPCs in the game; one might expect the NPCs to stand
out; however, only 5 of the 13 players remembered McNeil;
none remembered her name correctly. Less than half (5/13)
reported George and only one guessed at his name. Half
the subjects spoke of the other marines and team mates,
suggesting that they “could speak to you,” or “they were
helping you.” Of these, only one noted that the entire squad
was wiped out prior to play starting, though it is possible
that they attributed the unnamed grabber gun marine to this
squad. The CTH subjects were altogether more successful at
recalling names. Only 5/13 could not recall a single name
from the game, and two of these later remembered.
All subjects from both groups had no problem when
asked to provide a motive for one of the characters they
had identified. In the CTH group, these were usually fairly
accurate, and in many cases picked up on subtle nonludically
significant information. Player’s asked about the motive for
the marines being on Mars in RES which were far less
sure and in some cases highly creative in their responses.
9/13 players were asked and the results varied from the
semiaccurate “there was an incident,” “they used to go there
and lost the colony” to the false “they have discovered this
archeological site,” “conducting some research,” and fanciful
“human curiosity.” Only one subject noted the cover story
given in the opening sequence.
5.2. Environment
Subjects were asked to talk about the environments they
visited and then prompted with two further questions:
any particularly memorable features or details, and what
sounds were present? CTH splits into two levels: the opening
sequence in a dilapidated cult mansion and its underground
tunnels and Innsmouth itself. RES is all set in an archeo-
logical dig site, with alien architecture slowly transforming
into the human base sited above it. These were variously
described as caverns, mines, high-tech industrial, and Aztec.
The presence of technology was noted, often (4/13) in
relation to the number of boxes and crates lying around.
What was most striking about RES subjects descriptions
of the environment was how directly indexed to gameplay
mechanisms many of them were. 6 of the 13 subjects talked
explicitly about generic game devices rather than the
presented environment.
The darkness of the levels was the consistent feature
noted, with all subjects referencing it. Beyond that, features
were evenly distributed between pits, doors, and interactive
objects (a power cell transplant sequence was noted by
4 subjects). It was quickly recognised by 5 subjects that
each hostile agent was preceded by a signature sound; aside
from this, ambient noise was noted. However, no subject
reported the radio transmissions that sporadically interrupt
the action, nor the direct instructions from McNeil.
The CTH group found it easier to talk about the
environments, perhaps due to the diversity of spaces they
encountered. 12/13 subjects diﬀerentiated between the
two playable levels. Two subjects confused the cult house
with the asylum in the opening cutscene, which may be
attributable to the morgue and experiment rooms in the
basement. A further 7/13 used distinct narrative structuring
when describing the environments. 4 of the 13 subjects
referred to a gameplay mechanism: the save point, the fact
that the designers increased tension by reducing the sizes of
the environments at critical moments, the reduction of the
visual field with movie bars to indicate a cutscene, and the
lack of weapons increasing a sense of vulnerability. Finally,
4/13 subjects reported the town’s name unprompted (two
were correct), which may be interpreted as evidence as it
was engaged with on a homodiegetic level rather than just
as a game map. It is also worth noting that two subjects
questioned the reality of the Innsmouth level altogether,
both suggesting that the entire episode was actually a
hallucination and that the player had never recovered from
the six-year psychotic break that separates the levels. Again,
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this may be taken as evidence that they were engaging with
the environment at a significantly narrativised level.
5.3. Avatar
One thing both study groups shared was a very distinct
conceptual distance between player and avatar. Only two
subjects in the entire study referred to the action in the
first person. Further, the majority used the second when
discussing plot, character, and environment: “you go into the
basement,” “you are this marine.”
However, it is important to note that over identification
with the avatar can be problematic, as it exposes the
limitations of the game system [23]. The fact that most of
the subjects in the study felt that they were controlling Jack
or the marine, or in some cases “aiding” them, acting as a
team suggests that the avatars were functioning eﬀectively.
Subjects were first asked about their relationships to the
avatar, and then whether they thought he had a definable
character. If the answer was yes, they were prompted to try
and encapsulate this personality in few words. Finally, they
were asked about their motives and whether they considered
this to be the same as their avatars.
All but one of the CTH subjects easily identified with
Jack, citing the amount of background material as the
major reason they were able to do so (4/13 also stated that
the gameplay device of hearing his heartbeat increase in
times of stress helped draw them in). Although they clearly
distinguished themselves from him, 6/13 said they felt they
were looking through his eyes, or otherwise, operating in
tandem with the character. One suggested he felt as if he was
playing part of Jack’s mind, with the game script providing
the counterpoint. All the subjects said they could identify
a clear character, and their suggestions of personality fitted
those suggested by the game, with stating that the amnesia,
whilst giving him a motive to continue playing, was a block
to this. The one subject who failed to identify with Jack
said that whilst the amnesia gave him a motive to continue
playing, it blocked his empathising with the character. Four
also inferred personality from his responses to the game’s
action: “he asks a lot of questions,” “he is very curious,” “he is
not afraid of finding things out,” and seamlessly integrating
essential gameplay devices with the presented world. Most
felt that their motives and Jack’s coincided—a drive to find
things out, to solve the mystery of not just Innsmouth, but
the missing six years of his life.
RES subjects found empathy easy too but struggled more
with the notion of character. Although 8/13 felt that the
marine had a character, when asked to summarise his per-
sonality, there were noticeable pauses; then 5/13 constructed
a personality based around their play styles—either “cool,
level headed, not freaked out by what is happening” or “a
kick-ass marine.” The remaining four described the avatar as
bland, or a shell, though two of these suggested that as the
story progressed, they may understandmore about him. One
tied his motive to try to find his squad, which is completely
missing from the actual game; another candidly pointed out
that the initiation of the action comes from the avatar picking
up the artifact and that he was playing the “idiot who caused
it all.” Noticeably, the RES players were more likely (5/13)
to diﬀerentiate their motive from the avatars: whilst he was
variously “trying to get to the surface,” “escaping,” “staying
alive,” “returning the artifact for study,” they remained only
superficially involved, wanting to explore the game, or just
responding to wave after wave of hostile avatar. Several (3/13)
wanted additional characterisation to flesh out the marine’s
character.
5.4. Plot
The need for closure was highly evident in both subject
groups; most of whom assumed a closed narrative was
unfolding, even if they did not fully grasp it. CTH subjects
generally coped well with a highly complex narrative, includ-
ing an unconventional temporal sequence. One subject failed
to identify Jack in the opening sequence; another suggested
that the suicide was successful and the Innsmouth level was
not real. All of the CTH subjects described the plot fully or
near fully and did so using clear storytelling structures: there
was clear cause and eﬀect and understanding of temporal
sequencing. More to the point, every subject thought a story
was operating behind the action—two even suggested that
it was more important than the action (one describing the
experience as more like watching a film than playing a game)
and were happy to ascribe the gaps in the information
they were given to a plot arc they had yet to uncover
although most assumed they would uncover it. Asked if
they believed that other characters within the game knew
more than they did, all but one answered yes. Certainly,
Cthulhu is a mystery game and is quite deliberately aimed
at creating this impression. None of the subjects found the
action arbitrary—they all assumed that it was only their
ignorance of the final plot resolution that hindered their
understanding. Conspiracy, and its counterpart, amnesia, is a
powerful theme in FPS games, occurring in nearly every title,
and it is evident why this should be. Not only does it allow
narrative development to be oﬀered as a reward scheme, but
it also achieves two more direct gameplay functions. Firstly,
it lowers the player/avatar’s status, training them to be reliant
upon the system for information, which is why it is so often
attached to high-status NPCs. Secondly, it allows the system
to gain control over information shortfalls: it is simply not
necessary to oﬀer a complete package of information if the
closure is operating successfully—the player will contribute
at least the assumption that all will become clear and, as such,
shortfalls and contradictions can be masked.
Tellingly, even though RES subjects struggled to create a
full narrative of their experiences, quickly degenerating into
brief summaries “monsters come and you shoot them,” “you
just keep going until to find the boss,” and several 3/13 admit-
ted complete ignore as to what was going on; most (7/13)
believed there to be a story happening. This would seem to
confirm that Kermode’s question remains valid in the sphere
of game research. Only two drew attention to the PDAs
lying around the environment which provided background
story. One was convinced that McNeil would be revealed
to be the nemesis figure (another essential FPS device).
Two subjects noted that the “leaders” (presumably McNeil),
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rather than being in possession of extra information, had no
idea what was happening or what to do about it; three others
correctly recalled her statement that “I have seen this before.”
Narrative plays a very small part in Resurrection of Evil’s
action, and there is little in the way of a coherent ecology:
demons teleport in according to shock value and challenge,
and it is not altogether surprising that 4/13 subjects found
the action arbitrary.
6. CONCLUSION
A game with a high emphasis on story such as Cthulhu
seems to enable players to recall a substantial quantity of
the information it presents, even when this is presented in
a nonstandard and incomplete fashion. Although players
often fail to remember names, they are adept at either
recalling or inferring motive. Even though Cthulhu contains
a much higher number of characters than Resurrection of
Evil, subjects were able to remember much more about
them, suggesting that players of the latter were simply not
paying any attention to them. This may sound banal, but it
is evidence that the system is training the player to attach
significance. Further, the fact that players of Resurrection
found it diﬃcult to recall their actions in detail suggests that
a strong plot may not only act as a reward scheme but aid in
orientation and postexperience aﬀect.
Players in both titles inferred personality from cutscenes
and homodiegetic information where this was lacking; they
frequently constructed it themselves from the activities of
the avatar. The environments and objects of Resurrection
without a strong plot structure were recalled often according
to gameplay devices, whereas Cthulhu’s were placed in a
homodiegetic context. Finally, closure was clearly operating
across both games, even with a rudimentary narrative; Res-
urrection players inferred a body of unknown information
that many were convinced would be revealed to them, even
when they misread the plot—and often remembered little of
the primer from the opening cutscene.
Thus, rather than a late bolt-on, in reality no less sim-
plistic, or the alternate reward system, we need to consider
story within games as an integrated aspect of the overall
system. If utilising narrative devices such as character, plot,
closure, and voice has a direct and dynamic impact upon the
psychological processes in operation during the act of play.
Then, not only does this provide us with a less subjective
means of interpreting story in games, but it begins to open up
a pseudo-mechanistic approach to putting together eﬀective,
ludically functional stories. In order to achieve this, we
have proposed that the common issues of narrative can
be bypassed if we utilise the concept of protonarratives to
envisage story as a network of objects, with a degree of
predeterminism in terms of relationships which tend to yield
interpretation within a predetermined range.
In a very real sense, this invites us to, one way or
another, avoid the “art” of stories in favor of the “craft.” In
analysing story in games in this way, the mechanics of the
application of story to game design can be exposed, making
the highly complex field of narratology and its application
to psychology accessible to those whose specialisms lie in
other areas of game design and development. Further, it
highlights the direct impact story can have upon gameplay,
in terms of creating more memorable, complex and aﬀective
gaming experiences. We are in the position, in terms of the
maturation of the both game design and game research,
for the medium to demand a wholly distinct and specific
understanding of the nature and use of story as a functional
technology.
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